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The level of market interest rates has served as the principal
intermediate target of Federal Reserve monetary policy throughout most of the
System’s history. Concern about the behavior of monetary aggregates began in
the early 1950s, and explicit aggregate targeting in the early 1970s; for
several years beginning in the late 1970s, the growth rates of various
monetary aggregates largely supplanted interest rates as policy targets.
Recently, however, the System has drawn back from rigid adherence to aggregate
targeting, broadening its target ranges and allowing a wider variety of
considerations to influence the conduct of policy. While interest rates have
not been explicitly targeted, the System has adopted operating procedures
which give it tighter control over rates, and has intervened on more than one
occasion to change their average levels.1
The devices according to which the System has attempted to influence
interest rates have varied greatly over time. Initially the discount rate was
simply set at the target rate, and the Reserve Banks lent (discounted)
relatively freely at that rate. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, and
particularly with the outbreak of the Second World War, the System shifted to
a policy of influencing rates indirectly through open market operations.
Another outgrowth of the Depression was acquisition by the System of the
authority to set and vary the required reserve ratio imposed on member banks.
During 1936- 1937 the System used this authority in dramatic fashion, doubling
required reserve ratios in a series of steps in an attempt to absorb and
sterilize the large excess reserves then held by member banks. ~Thisaction
was followed immediately by, and is widely believed to have precipitated, the2
sharp recession of 1937~1938.2 Since this episode the System has adjusted
reserve ratios infrequently, and has not used changes in the ratio as a short-
or intermediate-term tool of policy.
During the 1950s the reluctance of the System to vary the reserve ratio
countercyclically, and in particular its tendency to reduce the ratio from
time to time without subsequently increasing it, attracted some criticism from
Congress. Kareken (1961) argued that that the justifications offered by the
System in defense ofthis behavior did not stand up under careful scrutiny.
He did not, however, attempt to provide a positive rationale for a more active
*
policy with regard to ratio changes.
One of the reasons the System has avoided frequent reserve ratio changes
has undoubtedly been the desire to avoid a repetition of events like those of
of 1936-1938. Prior to 1980, another source of restraint was the desire to
prevent the financial burden of reserve ratio maintenance from driving member
banks out of the System.3 This danger existed because the reserve ratios
imposed by state banking agencies were typically lower and less variable~than
those imposed by the System. A related source of restraint has been the use
of lagged reserve accounting, which reduces the short-run effectiveness of
policy interventions which rely directly or indirectly on the required reserve
*
Kareken observed (p. 65) that “the economic effects produced by a change in
reserve ratios differ significantly from those produced by an equivalent open
market operation,” but did not elaborate. He devoted the bulk of his paper
to arguing that “official reasons for making day-to-day adjustments in member
banks’ reserve positions by means of open market sales and purchases will not
standup under close scrutiny, and the same can be said of the post-Accord
record on reserve ratios.” His analysis included an attack on what remain
the most frequently-cited reasons for the failure of the Federal Reserve
System to use the required reserve ratio as an active policy instrument --
that significant changes in the ratio have large, discontinuous effects, and
that frequent small changes would unduly complicate banks’ reserve
management problem.3
ratio. The shift to lagged accounting, which occurred in 1968, was designed
to reduce member banks’ costs of compliance with System reserve requirements.4
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 gave the Federal Reserve System power to
set required reserve ratios for a broader range of transactions accounts, and
for all depository institutions. In addition, in 1984 the System returned to
contemporaneous reserve accounting. These legislative and regulatory changes
have created conditions under which the required reserve ratio could acquire a
more active role as an instrument of monetary policy.5
Until recently, academic analyses of monetary policy have paid scant
attention to role of Federal Reserve base money creation in helping finance
federal government budget deficits. Since reserve requirememts are an
important source of demand for base money, this omission may detract
substantially from our understanding of both the economic impact of changes in
reserve ratios and the formulation of policy regarding reserve requirements.
Goodfriend and Ilargraves (1983) point out that during recent decades revenue
considerations have exerted considerable influence on government
(Congressional and Treasury, as well as Federal Reserve System) behavior
regarding reserve requirements.
One of the reasons the financing implications of reserve requirement
policy have so often been ignored is that models capable of describing them
convincingly have not been available. The development of dynamic general
equilibrium monetary models has gone far towards solving this problem. In
recent years authors such as Wallace (1984), Romer (1985), and Freeman (1987)
have used different specifications of the overlapping generations model to
examine the interrelationships between the required reserve ratio, other
monetary policy instruments, government budget deficits, and the levels of
endogenous real and nominal variables.64
The purpose of our paper is to examine the implications of use of the
required reserve ratio as an active policy instrument in a model in which
(1) monetary policy decisions are constrained by the requirements of deficit
finance and (2) the monetary authority targets interest rates. In particular,
we are interested in contrasting the effects of changes in the required
reserve ratio with those of open market purchases or sales which achieve the
same rate targets.
Our analysis is conducted in the context of stylized policy situations
(initial settings, problems, and goals) which we view as analogous to actual
situations frequently confronted by the Federal Reserve System. We assume
that the initial level of real (or nominal) interest rates is viewed by the
monetary authorities as “too high,” and that they consequently select a lower
target. We assume that the authorities can choose between two policy
instruments: the required reserve ratio, which can be changed directly, and
the ratio of nominal bonds to nominal money, which can be changed through open
market operations. (We do not examine policy experiments involving changes in
both instruments.) Finally, we assume that the authority seeks the instrument




We make this assumption because it seems clear that the System continues
to regard a higher rate of inflation as the principal “cost” of policy
interventions designed to reduce market interest rates (and vice-versa).
See for example, the recent Summary Report of the Federal Reserve Board
(dated 20 February 1990), which surveyed monetary policy during 1989:
(p. 10) In the opening months of the year, the Federal Open
Market Committee extended the move toward restraint
which began almost a year earlier, seeking to counter
a disquieting intensification of inflationary pressures.
Policy actions in January and February, restraining
credit availability and increasing the discount rate,5
The model we use for this purpose is borrowed from Wallace (1984), who
used it to examine the effects of open market operations. He assumes
throughout his analysis that a binding reserve ratio is imposed, and comments
in a closing footnote that his model can also be used to study the effects of
changes in reserve requirements. Our extension is conducted along these
lines, though unlike Wallace we are not primarily concerned with welfare
comparisons.
Our use of this model in an attempt to gain insights into the effects of
practical policy experiments raises a potentially troubling issue which we
need to discuss before proceeding. Wallace found that the effects of open
market operations were often “perverse” -- that while a reduction in the
bonds/currency ratio (an open market purchase) always produced a lower real
interest rate, it often resulted in a lower rather than higher rate of
inflation. Since reducing the required reserve ratio (the other device for
reducing the real rate) always produces a higher rate of inflation, under
“perverse” circumstances our monetary authority will always prefer open market
purchases.
In practice it is clear that the Federal Reserve System does not see
itself as facing perverse circumstances, and believes instead that any move to
ease credit conditions creates inflationary pressures. Since we are
prompted a further 3/4 percentage point increase in
short-term market interest rates.
(p. 3) In June, the FOMC began a series of steps, undertaken
with care to avoid excessive inflationary stimulus,
that trimmed 1 1/2 percentage points from short-term
interest rates by yearend.6
interested in giving “advice” (of an admittedly abstract sort) to the System,
we confine ourselves to studying circumstances under which this is the case.
(We refer to these circumstances as those in which the “conventional wisdom”
holds true.) We conclude the introduction to this paper with a brief
discussion of the empirical plausibility of these circumstances.
In his 1984 paper Wallace shows that in a stationary economy, a
sufficient condition for “perverse” results is that the real interest rate on
government bonds exceeds the real growth rate of the economy.7 The logic
behind this result is quite simple. In Wallace’s model the entire real
deficit is “pure” in the sense of being uncovered by future surpluses. As a
result, in equilibrium the real deficit must be covered by a combination of
currency and bond seigniorage. When real interest rates exceed real growth
rates, bond seigniorage is negative. An increase in the ratio of bonds to
money (an open market sale) increases the losses on bond seigniorage, and thus
forces an increase in currency seigniorage -- which is to say a higher rate of
inflation.
At the time Wallace was writing the U.S. was in the midst of a lengthy
period during which real interest rates almost certainly exceeded real growth
rates. Darby (1984), commenting on a earlier (1981) paper by Sargent and
Wallace which obtained similarly “perverse” results, shows that historically
this inequality has typically been reversed. During the years since Wallace
wrote the relationship between these variables has been much closer to
historical form: the real growth rate exceeded the real interest rate for four
of the six years beginning in 1984, and the average growth rate for this
period exceeded the average real interest rate by approximately one half of7
one percent.8 Thus both trend and historical experience suggest that if we
have not already returned to a situation of the sort necessary for the
conventional wisdom to hold, we may soon do so.
Real growth rates in excess of real interest rates are not sufficient for
the conventional wisdom, however. Under the assumptions described in the next
section the conventional wisdom will hold whenever a decrease in the
bond/currency ratio reduces total revenue from bond seigniorage. Now a
decrease in the ratio reduces the real value of bonds, which tends to reduce
bond seigniorage revenue; it also reduces the real interest rate on bonds,
which has the opposite tendency. When the latter effect dominates, as is
often the case, an open market purchase permits a reduction in currency
*
seigniorage revenues, which is to say a lower inflation rate.
It turns out that under the aforementioned assumptions the initial
bond/currency ratio must be relatively low for the conventional wisdom to
hold. This is true in part because low bond/currency ratios tend to be
associated with low real interest rates, and in part because when the initial
volume of bonds is low the negative effect on bond seigniorage of a reduction
in bond volume is more easily offset by the positive effect of higher unit
revenues.
Our analytical need for a low bond/currency ratio creates a potential
conflict with the empirical facts concerning the ratio. At the time Wallace
was writing its value for the U.S. was on the order of 7; it has since
*
The assumption that gross saving is fixed, so that real currency balances are
a positive multiple of the required reserve ratio, is critical to the
simplictiy of the analysis just presented. Were gross saving increasing in
the real interest rate (for example) an open market purchase might, by
reducing gross saving, reduce real currency balances as well as the real
volume of bonds. This would make a perverse inflation response less likely.8
increased, and now approaches b.9 In simple specifications of the type
presented in the text of the paper, ratios such as these are far too high to
support the conventional wisdom, given plausible initial values for the real
interest rate and the inflation rate. Fortunately, we have recently succeeded
in constructing specifications of a slightly more general type for which the
conventional wisdom holds at bonds/currency ratios consistent with the
empirical values just cited, as well as plausible initial real interest and
inflation rates. One specification of this type is described in the appendix
to this paper.9
II. The Model
As noted above, our model is borrowed from Wallace (1984). At each
discrete date t1 a total of N two-period lived agents (the members of
generation t) are born. The preferences of each of these agents are
representable by the utility function U(c1(t),c2(t+1)), where c~(t)
represents the amount of the single consumption good consumed at date t. We
assume that U(.,) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
quasiconcave, and strictly increasing in each argument. We also assume that
it satisfies the “Inada conditions”





The members of generation 0 (the “initial old”) simply maximize their
consumption of date 1 good.
Each generation t1 includes two groups of agents: savers and borrowers.
These agents receive intertemporal endowments (w~(t),w~(t+b)), i = s,b, where
s and b represent savers and borrowers, respectively. Their intertemporal
budget constraints are
c’(t+b) . w’(t+b)
C~(t) + 111(t) = w~(t)+ ~~(t) i = s,b,
where Rb(t) will henceforth be denoted R(t), and R5(t) will be denoted Rd(t).
Borrowers’ aggregate savings function is D(R(t)) = N[w~(t)-c~(R(t))]; we
require D(R(t)) < 0 for relevant values of R(t). Savers’ aggregate savings10
function is S(Ra(t)) = N[w~(t)-c~(Rd(t))]; we assume S(R(t)) > 0 for
R(t) > 0 . The c~(R~(t)) represent optimal levels of first period consumption
for agents endowed (w~(t),w~(t+b)) and confronted by interest rates
i = s,b.
The government must finance a real deficit of G at each date tb .It may
do so by issuing fiat currency in the amount 11(t) or bonds in the amount B(t).
Bonds issued at date t are payable in fiat currency at date t+1; B(t)
represents the face value at date t+b of the bonds issued at date t. Let p(t)
represent the price of a unit of fiat currency in units of the consumption
good at date t, and Pb(t) the date t price, in units of fiat currency, of a
bond with a face value of one unit of fiat currency. The government’s budget
constraint is then given by
(1) G = p(t) [I1(t)-I1(t-b)] + p(t) [Pb(t)B(t)-B(t-1)] , t1
The initial quantities 11(0) and B(0) constitute the aggregate endowment of the
members of generation 0.
Any borrowing or lending which may occur in this economy is assumed to be
intermediated by commercial banks which operate competitively and costlessly.
These banks are required to hold fiat currency reserves equal at minimum to a
positive fraction A of their total liabilities (deposits). The banks lend to
borrowers and/or the government at rate R(t), and borrow (accept deposits)
from savers at rate Rd(t). Since the banks must earn zero profits, we have
(2) Rd(t) = AR(t) + (b-A)Rm(t)
as a condition of equilibrium, where Rm(t) Pj~~) . R~(t)is the (real)
rate of return on fiat currency held from date t to date t+b.lb
A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with a binding required
reserve ratio consists of a positive constant A, and a set of nonnegative
sequences for 11(t), B(t), R~(t),Rd(t), R(t), p(t), and Pb(t), for all t1 ,
which satisfy conditions (1) and (2), as well as
(3) AS(Rd(t)) = p(t)M(t)
(4) S(Rd(t)) + D(R(t)) = p(t)[11(t)+Pb(t)B(t)]
R (t)
(5) R(t) = Pb(t) with Pb(t) < 1
Condition (3) ensures that banks comply with the reserve requirement, and that
there are no excess reserves. Condition (4) guarantees that the credit market
clears -- that the excess of private saving over private borrowing is absorbed
by private purchases of bonds and fiat currency. Condition (5) ensures that
government bonds and private securities are perfect substitutes for banks, and
that nonbank agents do not choose to hold fiat currency.
Unfortunately, analysis of the general version of this model gets quite
complicated. In order to simplify the analysis we make the following sets of
additional assumptions:
Set 1: Regularity of savings behavior.
We assume that gross savings are fixed -- invariant, in particular, to changes
in the rate of return on deposits. That is, S(Rd) = S > 0 for all Rd > 0
In addition, we assume that the gross borrowing function D(R) satisfies
D’(R) > 0 and D’ ‘(R) < 0 for all R > 0 .12
Set 2: Existence of a pure currency seigniorage (/3 = 0) equilibrium with a
binding reserve ratio and a gross real interest rate less than unity.
We assume that the demand functions are specified, and the reserve ratio A
selected, so that when /3 = 0 there exists a rate of return vector
1(A) = (R(A),R~(A)) which satisfies the binding reserve ratio equilibrium
conditions as well as lt(A) < 1 . Stated differently, we assume that there
exists 1(A) such that 1 > R(A) > Rm(A) > 0 , [l-R(A)]AS = G , and
(b-A)S + D(R(A)) = 0.
Notice that G < AS is an immediate implication of the second set of
assumptions.
Assumption set #2 is fairly strong; it is easy to specify plausible
demand functions, and values of A, so that R(A) > 1. It turns out, however,
that in specifications of this type the “conventional wisdom” never holds.
One simple assumption which is sufficient (but ~~jj necessary -- see
Example 1) to ensure that R(A) < 1 for at least some binding values of A is
that the deficit G can be financed without reserve requirements: that is, that
** *
there exists 0 < it < 1 such that (b-R ) [S÷D(R)] = G . Having made this
assumption, define the “threshold” reserve ratio -- the highest nonbinding
ratio -- by ~ !÷~*) , and define ~ S÷~(1) ; t is the reserve ratio
which generates R(A) = 1 . Since S+D(R ) < AS whenever A is binding, we
must have G < AS , which in turn implies > 0 (see pp. 17-18 below).
Consequently ~ , and R(A) < 1 whenever A E (A,I)13
In what follows we also confine our attention to stationary equilibria.
A stationary equilibrium can be defined as consisting of a positive
constant A, and nonnegative values it, R~,R~,p1, PbB, and M which satisfy
(1’) G = (1-R~)M+ (b-R)PbB




~ 1~ — m
~ ~b11T
where M = p(t)11(t) and B = p(t)B(t).
III. Open Market Operations
Define /3 = ~I~3 . Following Wallace (1984) we view /3, the nominal
bonds/currency ratio, as a policy instrument which can be varied through open
market operations. We will assume henceforth that /3 0
Notice that (1’) and (4’) can now be rewritten
(1’’) G = M[(1-R~)+ (b-R)fiPb]
(4’’) S + D(R) = M[b + ~~b1
Given the definition of /3, conditions (3’) and (5’) are readily seen to imply
it
PbB = fiAS—~. This identity, along with condition (3’), allows us to rewrite
conditions (1’’) and (4’’) as14
it
(6) [l-A(1÷/3~!)]S + D(R) = 0 , and
(7) G = AS[1 + 1t~{/3(~-b) - b}]
In Sections III and IV we examine the properties of the functions R(fl,A)
and R~(fi,A) which are implicitly defined by equations (6) and (7). We begin
by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to verify the existence of these
functions. Define I (R,R~) , and the vector-valued function g(t;fl,A) by
it
g1(I;fi,A) [b-A(b+fi~)]S+ D(R)
g2(I;fi,A) AS[b + R~{fl(~-b) - b}] - G
Equilibrium functions R(/3,A) and R~(/3,A)exist in an open neighborhood around
a given (/3 ,A ) so long as there exists an equilibrium vector (I ;fl ,A ) and
the derivative matrix D1g(I*;fl*,A*) is not singular. Differentiation reveals
that it (l+/3 )-/3 > 0i s sufficient to ensure that D1g(R ;/3 ,A ) has a
nonzero determinant.
Lemma. R(b-t-fi)-/3 > 0 in any stationary equilibrium with a binding reserve
ratio.
Proof:
Recall [equilibrium condition (1’)] that G = (b~Rm)M+ (l-R)PbB , where
M = AS and PbB = AS—,1t~!!/3 . Thus we can write G = AS[(b-R~)+(b-R)—~fi]
Now suppose it < -4 . This implies
G AS[(b-R~)+(b-R)(b+fl)R~]
= AS[l+Rm(fi~R(1+/9))]15
Since R -~ fl-R(b+fl) 0 , we have G > AS. Thus G < AS
(an implication of assumption set #2 -- see above) implies R(1+fl)-/3 > 0.
Equations (6) and (7) can now be differentiated in order to obtain the
OR
following expressions for and
OR RPbB
= fl{D’(It)[R(b÷fl)-flj + PbB(b+4
8)}
OR~ ~ D’(R)(b-R) - PbB
= ~S73 D’(R)[R(b+/3)-/3j + PbB(l+fl)
OR
The Lemma ensures that > 0 , and that the denominator of is positive.
Consequently positivity of the numerator is necessary and sufficient for
OR
> 0 . Notice that it > 1 suffices to ensure that the numerator is
nonpositive. Thus since > 0 , R(A) <1is necessary for the conventional
wisdom to hold for any positive value of /3 (see above). Notice also that
since PbB = (1-A)S + D(R) , the numerator is positive whenever
(1-R)D’(R) - D(R) > (l-A)S
OR
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the conventional wisdom (~p~ > 0) holds
whenever /3 is sufficiently low -- as we suggested in Section I.
Proposition 1. Let A represent a required reserve ratio which is binding when
/3 = 0 . Then there exists /3 > 0 such that /3 E [0,fi) , which is to say
-. - OR
R E [R(A),R(fi,A)) , implies .~7~!~(fl,A) > 016
Proof:
OR
Define F(/3,A) = [1-R(fi,A)]D’(R(/3,A))-D(R(/3,A)) . For > 0
F(fl,A) > (b-A)S . Recall that F(fi,A) > (b-A)S is equivalent to
R
(b-R)D’(R) > (b-A)S + D(R) = PbB , and that PbB = flAS~~~! . Since R(A) < 1
-~ OR
by hypothesis, we have (1-R(A))D’(R(A)) > 0 . Thus > 0 at /3 = 0.
Since > 0 , assumption set #1 implies that < 0
Equations (6) and (7) can be used to show that R(/3) =
(1-A)S+ D(l) > 0 . Since F(j3’) = -D’(l) < 0 <
seen that F(0) > (1-A)S , we know that there exists
such that F(fi) = 0 , and that F(~3)> 0 for 0 /3
Since > 0 we know that R(A) < it < 1 , and that
RE [R(A),lt)
so long as it 1
1 is solved by
(1-A)S , and we have
a unique /3 E (0,/3’)
/3 . Define it R(fi)
(b-R)D’(R) > (1-A)S for
An example which establishes that this proposition is not vacuous appears
below.
Example 1.
Let S = , D(R) = -~ , A = , and G = . [These demand
functions will arise if each generation tb consists of N “saver~”with
preferences IJ(c1,c2) = ln c1
+ ln c2 and endowments (w~,w~) = (1,0) , and N
“borrowers” with identical preferences and endowments (w~,w~) = (0,~) .]
we need
Now = D’’(R)~(b-R)- 2~D’(R)
= ~[D’’(R)(1-R) - 2D’(R)]17
Since (b-R)[S+D(R)] = G does not have real solutions any positive reserve
ratio is binding; the smallest feasible ratio is and necessitates R~ = 0
Nevertheless, R(~)= < 1 . The value of /3’ is , and the value of ~3is
approximately 0.5851 ; R(fl,~)~ 0.9428 . A plot of F(fl,~) over the domain
[0,/3] is displayed as Figure 1
IV. Changes in the Required Reserve Ratio
We have seen that an open market purchase (a reduction in the
bonds/currency ratio) always has the effect of “loosening” (reducing real
interest rates). Under the conditions of Proposition 1, moreover, tightening
is “inflationary” (reduces the rate of return on currency). These results
conform to the “conventional wisdom” regarding the impact of open market
operations. It is useful to establish analogous results for changes in the
required reserve ratio. A reduction in this ratio always “loosens” in the
sense of reducing the real interest rate. And whenever loosening via open
market purchases is “inflationary,” loosening via reserve ratio reductions is
also inflationary.
Equations (6) and (7) can be differentiated with respect to A instead
OR
of /3 , and solved for and ~ . When this is done it is readily seen that
fiG + [S+D(R)] [R(l+fi)-/3]
= A{D’(R)[R(l+fl)-fij + PbB(b+fl)}
OR ~ D’(R) - RmPbB(b+/3)
= AjD’(R)[R(b+fi)-flj + PbB(b+fi)}18
Since S+D(R) = M + PbB > 0 , Lemma 1 ensures that > 0
Since >0 implies PbB < (1-R)D’(R) ~j4~ > (1-it) is
> 0 . And since G = AS[(1-R~) + (l-R)~fi] and
have = ~_(1~Rm) + (1-it) . Consequently we need
(1-R)] > (1-R) ~—+ ~ ~—(1-R~) > ~ (1-it)
+—+ ~— > 1 . This is true whenever A is binding.
V. Real Interest Rate-Pegging Experiments
In this section we analyze the inflationary implications of~ the use of
open market purchases, or reductions in the required reserve ratio, to reduce
the level of real interest rates. We attempt in particular to derive




implies ~-,~(fl,A) > 0
Proof:
OR OR
Since the Lemma ensures that the denominator of is positive, ~ > 0
whenever ~ D’(R) - RfflPbB(l+/3) > 0 . Given that PbB = /3AS~, multiplying
both sides of this condition by yields the equivalent condition
fiG D’(R) - (PbB)2(1+/3) > 0 . The latter condition is equivalent in turn to
~ D’(R) > PbB
sufficient for
PbB = AS~!fl, we
~ [~_(1-R~) +
> (1-R)19
conditions under which a decline in the real interest rate engineered via open
market operations results in a larger (or smaller) increase in the inflation
rate than a decline brought about by a reduction in the reserve ratio.
It may be helpful to begin by describing our “rate-pegging experiments”
in terms of discrete changes in policy instruments and interest rates.
Suppose we begin with a particular specification of the model, and a
particular setting of the policy vector (/3,A); we will call the latter (71,X).
If X is binding at 73 this policy vector generates a unique real interest rate
it R(73,X) , and a unique currency rate of return 1t~ R~(lJ,X)
Now suppose the monetary authority attempts to reduce the real interest
rate by reducing the bonds/currency ratio, holding the required reserve ratio
fixed. In particular, suppose that the authority chooses /3 with 0 < /3 < 73
generating it R(fi,X) and Rm R~(fl,X) . We know that it < It ; under
assumptions described in Proposition 1, we also know that R~ < Itm~
Suppose instead that the authority attempts to achieve the same reduction
in the real interest rate by holding the bonds/currency ratio fixed and
reducing the required reserve ratio. That is, suppose there exists a binding
reserve ratio A < t such that R(73,A) = it. We are interested in the
relative magnitudes of R~(/3,X) R~ and R~(73,A) R~.
Unfortunately, we know of no easy way to provide a general
characterization of the results of discrete rate pegging experiments. We opt
instead for an approach which does not (at least in the first instance)
involve discrete changes, and allows us to use calculus techniques.
We begin by reinterpeting our model by treating the reai interest rate it
as a parameter, along with the reserve ratio A, and treating the
bonds/currency ratio /3 as an endogenous variable. We then compute the
derivative of R~,the rate of return on currency, with respect to it -- holding20
the reserve ratio A fixed. This derivative describes the inflationary
implications of a marginal reduction in it engineered by a reduction in /3.
Next we reinterpret the model by treating R as a parameter, along with
the bonds/currency ratio /3, and treating the required reserve ratio A as an
endogenous variable. Again we compute the derivative of Rm with respect to it
-- this time holding ~3 fixed. The derivative in question describes the
inflationary implications of a marginal reduction in it engineered by a
reduction in A. Finally, we evaluate this derivative at the value of /3
associated with the initial levels of it and A from the previous experiment.
This choice of /3 ensures that each of the two experiments start at the same
equilibrium position, and permits a fair comparison of the induced increases
in the inflation rate.
A. Endogenization of ~3
Notice that equilibrium conditions (1’) and (3’) imply
G = AS(b_Rm) + PbB(b_R) . And since conditions (3’) and (4’) imply
PbB = (b-A)S + D(R) , we can write G = AS(1-it~) + (1-R)[(1-A)S + D(R)]
This equation can be solved for Rm~yielding
it ‘it A’ — (AS-G) + (1-R)[(b-A)S + D(R)]
m’ ‘ ~‘ — AS
Notice that
OR~ — (1-R)D’(R) - [(1-A)S + D(R)1 — (1R)~)’(~~) - I’bB
AS — AS21
OR
Thus ~~(R,A) > 0 whenever the conventional wisdom holds.
We can also use (3’), (4’), and (5’) to obtain the equation
(1-A)S + D(R) = fiAS—1~
. Substituting Rm(R~A) into this expression and then
solving it for /3 yields
it A — R1(b-A)S + D(R)1
- (AS-G) + (b-k)[(l-~+ D(R)j
B. Endogenization of A
Equation (7) can be solved for Rm~yielding it~ = AS~G1~
. This
AS[1 -
expression for it~can be substituted into equation (6) , and the latter solved
for A. This procedure yields
AtR ~ — [R(1÷fl)-fi][S+D(R)] + fiG
‘ “j’ — R(b+/3)S
Equation (6) can also be solved for Rm~yielding R~= ~ [S+~R)- 1]
Substituting A(R,/3) into this expression generates
it ~ — R ~ R(1+fi) S+D(R)1
“j’ - 73 [R(l÷fl)-8j S+D(R)j + fiG
Differentiation then produces
~~(R,fi) = (1+fi)R2GD’(R) - fl1S+D(R)-G~2
{[R(1+fi)-fi] [S+D(R)] + /3G}22
= /3IR2GD’(R) - (S+D(R)-G)2] + R2GD’(R)
{fi[R(S+D(R)) - (S+D(it)-G)] + R(S+D(R))}2
C. Derivative comparisons
OR OR
We wish to compare the magnitudes of ~~(it,A) and ~~R,fi) . These
derivatives describe the declines in the rate of return on currency associated
with marginal declines in the real interest rate which are caused by
reductions in the bonds/currency ratio or reductions in the required reserve
ratio, respectively. Stated differently, we wish to determine the relative
magnitudes of the inflation rate increases associated with attempts to use
open market purchases, or reductions in the required reserve ratio, to peg
interest rates at levels marginally lower than their current levels. When we
do this we must ensure that each of the two rate-pegging experiments whose
results are compared begins at the same equilibrium position; that is, that
OR
the values of /3 and A associated with ~~(R,A) are identical to those
OR OR
associated with ~~R,fl) . We accomplish this by evaluating ~~(R,fi) at
fi(lt,A) and forming the function
OR OR
~b(R,A) .~it!~(R,A) - ~~R,fi(R,A))
Substituting the expression for fi(R,A) into the second expression for
OR
~~R,fl) yields (after considerable simplification)
= [(S+D(R)-G) - RPbB] [RGD’(R)- PbB(S+D(R)_G)] R[S÷D(R)-G] (AS)23
where as always PbB = (1-A)S + D(R)
Proposition 3 demonstrates that reducing the real interest rate by cutting the
required reserve ratio is always more inflationary than reducing the rate
through open market purchases.
Proposition 3. Assumption sets #1 and #2 imply ~(R,A) < 0
Proof:
We have seen that
(b-R)D’(R) - PbB [(S+D(R)-G) - RPbB] [RGD’(R) - PbB(S+D(R)_G)]
__________ - 2
AS R[S+D(R)-G] (AS)
It can ultimately be shown that q~(R,A)~ 0 as
- itD’(R)~AS-G1 {G - (b-it) [S+D(R)]} ~ PbB {G - (1-it) [S+D(R)]}
Condition (1’) requires G = (b-R~)M+ (l-it)PbB . Now (l-R~)M+ (l-it)PbB >
(1-R)[M + PbB] , since condition (5’) requires R~ < it . Since condition (4’)
requires S + D(R) = M + PbB , we have G > (1-R)[S+D(it)] . Consequently
~‘it A’ ? o a - RD’(R)[AS-G] > ~ B
y” ~ / S+D(R)-G < b24
Since it > 0 , we know G > S+D(R) . Assumption set #1 gives us D’(R) > 0
and set #2 gives us AS > G . Consequently the left-hand-side term above is
strictly negative. As the right hand-side-term is nonnegative, we have
~(R,A)< 0
VI. Nominal Interest Rates
The direct observability of nominal interest rates makes them convenient
short-run targets for monetary policy.10 It seems therefore of interest to
determine the effects of changes in /3 and A on the level of nominal interest
rates, and to determine the effects on inflation rates and real interest rates
of attempts to use changes in these parameters to reduce nominal rates.
We begin by confirming the existence of a function Rnom(fi~A) which
links the nominal interest rate to the levels of the policy parameters in an
open neighborhood around a given parameter setting. Since RnOffl = , we can
rewrite (6) and (7) as
(6) S + D(R) = AS[1 + R~ ~
nom
(7) G = AS[(1 - ~R ~ + fi~1-R)1 nom nom25
Now define .1 = (R~Rnom) , and the vector-valued function g(1,~3,A)by
g1(I;fl,A) S + D(R) - AS[1 + nom
g2(1,fi,A) AS[(1 - ~ ) + fi~1-R)~ - G
nom nom
Equilibrium functions R(fi,A) and Rnom(fi~A)exist in an open neighborhood
around a given (/3 ,A ) so long as there exists an equilibrium vector
(1*;/3*,A*) and the derivative matrix D~g(1*;fi*,A*) is not singular.
Differentiation reveals that R (1±fi)-fl > 0i s sufficient to ensure that
D~g(i*;fi*,A*)has a nonzero determinant.
Notice that = ~— , we have
Oitnom R~ - it~! = R~AS - it [(1- R)D’ (it) - PbB]
°fi R~ R{D’(R)[R(1+/3)-fi] + PbB(l+/3)}
Alternatively, conditions (6) and (7) can be differentiated with respect
to /3 , and the resulting equations solved for and This procedure
yields
OR0
— it [(1+/1)AS - RD’ (R) (1- R)]
il/i - fl(b+fl)AS + it D’(R)LR(l+fi)-flj
In either case, it is readily seen that ~~0m~ 0 as i~ PbB ~ (b-it)D’(R)
or equivalently as F(/3,A) 1473 (b-R)D’(R) - D(it) ~ (1-A)S . N~oticethat
F(fi,A) < (b-A)S [since F(/3,A) = (1-A)S] . Thus there exists an open interval26
around fi on which ~°‘~ > 0 . Notice also that F(0,A) = (1-A)S [since at
/3 = 0 we have (1-A)S + D(R) = 0 J; it can be shown that F’(O,A) ~ 0 as
R(1-it)D’(R) ~ AS-G . Since it < 1 by assumption, when Gi ssufficiently large
(close to AS) there is an open interval to the right of (but not including)
OR
/3 = 0 on which ~Ofl1 < 0 . It is possible, however, to construct examples
in which ~°~> 0 , and indeed in which 0~0m > 0 for all /3 > 0
Unfortunately, we cannot make the conditions under which ~ > 0 more
precise than those just described. This is disappointing, since one might
well regard > 0 as part and parcel of the “conventional wisdom”:
certainly the monetary authorities seem to believe that open market purchases
drive down nominal interest rates. What we can say is contained in
Proposition 4.
(1) Let G solve R(1-R)D’ (it) = AS-G , with the understanding that C = 0
if this equation has no positive solution for G . Then if
G E (G,AS), there exists a range of nonnegative (but relatively
small) values of /3 at which the the conventional wisdom holds for
real rates but not nominal rates. This range is bounded below by,
but does not include, /3 = 0
(2) There exists a range of positive (and relatively large) values of /3
at which the conventional wisdom holds for both nominal and real
rates. This range includes, and is bounded above by, /3 = /327
Example 2 below describes the simplest situation of this type. In this
- OR
example there exists /3’ (0,~3) such that ~om < 0 whenever /3 (0,fl’)
OR -
and > 0 whenever /3 (/3’ ,fi] . [Note that the existence of at least
one /3 (0,/3) such that 0~om(fi,A)= 0i s guaranteed by Proposition 4.]
Example 2.
This economy is identical to that of Example 1. The value of /3’ (see
above) is approximately 0.1110 < /3 ~ 0.5851 . A plot of the function F(fi,~)
over the domain (0,fi) is presented in Figure 2.
OR
The procedure for obtaining ~‘~‘~‘is essentially similar to that for
obtaining ~°1” Implementing it yields
____ — 1 {flG + A[S÷D(it)]} {RmfiAS - R[PbB + RD’(R)} R2[S÷D(R)]
äA - R~/3A2S A +
where A fi{D’(R)[R(l+fi)-fi] + (l+fi)PbB} . It can then be shown that
OR > 0 1+fl PB > GD ’ it
UA ~ as 73 b ~ S+D(R)
Since G > (1-R)[S+D(R)] , ~om > 0 implies 0~0m> 0, and < 0
implies ~ < 0. Thus 0~iom< 0 for /3 (0,fi’], and indeed for some
distance to the right of /3’, in the example above. Stated differently, we can28
use specifications which conform to the hypotheses of Proposition 1 to
OR OR
construct “perverse” examples in which > 0 and ~°‘~‘ > 0 , but
~om < 0 . In these examples a marginal reduction in the nominal interest
rate can be effected either by a reduction in the bonds/currency ratio or by
OR
an increase in the required reserve ratio. Since ~ > 0 whenever the
conventional wisdom holds, in “perverse” examples a reserve ratio adjustment
which reduces the nominal interest rate will also reduce the inflation rate.
Clearly, open market purchases are not always the inflation-minimizing method
of reducing the nominal rate; stated differently, we will not be able to
obtain an analogue of Proposition 3 for nominal interest rate-pegging.
Notice, however, that in “perverse” examples reserve ratio adjustments that
bring down the nominal rate also causes the real rate to increase. Thus in
economies like these reserve ratio changes are of doubtful utility to
policymakers whose ultimate objective is to ease real credit conditions.
At /3 we have PbB = (1-R)D’(R), so ~ ~ 0a s (1-R)[S+D(it)] ~
1 +fi
Thus we may not always be able to construct “thoroughly conventional” examples
in which > 0 , > 0 , and ~~om> 0 . Example 3 describes an
economy in which it j~ possible to construct such examples. In fact, in this
economy the interval (0,13) on which the “conventional wisdom” holds can be
partitioned into the following disjoint and consecutive subintervals:
OR OR
(1) a “thoroughly perverse” interval on which ~Om < 0 and ~ <
(2) a “perverse” interval on which > 0 but ~ < 0 ,~ and
OR OR
(3) a “thoroughly conventional” interval on which > 0 and ~‘°‘~ > 029
Example 3.
This economy is also identical to that of Example 1. The lower bound of
the “thoroughly conventional” interval is 73 ~ 0.4660 < /3 ~ 0.5851 . A plot
of the function V(fi,
1
-~) ~ G 1 D’(it(fi,~)) - D(R(fl,~)) over
+ ( (fi’i-&)
the domain (0,13) appears in Figure 2. Notice that the F curve crosses the
OR
horizontal line (1-A)S at 73 . When the curve lies above the line ~om < 0
OR
when it lies below the line om > 0
In this example the “thoroughly conventional” interval is short relative
to the “perverse” interval. Both the existence and length of this interval
are quite sensitive to changes in the specification, however. Increasing G to
0.0125 eliminates it entirely; reducing G to 0.0075 makes it longer than the
perverse interval.
The existence of “thoroughly conventional” intervals suggests the
possibility that a reduction in the nominal interest rate engineered via a
change in the required reserve ratio can (1) produce a lower inflation rate
than an equal nominal rate reduction engineered by open market purchases
while (2) causing a decline in the real interest rate -- stated differently,
that there might be circumstances under which an inflation-averse policymaker
who desired to reduce the nominal interest rate without tightening real credit
conditions would prefer reducing the required reserve ratio to conducting open
market purchases. So far we have succeeded neither in constructing examples
in which this is the case nor in proving that no such examples exist. We ~
show that any example of this type which may exist will involve a tradeoff30
between inflation rates and real interest rates: that is, that whenever a
nominal interest rate decline engineered by a reduction in the required
reserve ratio produces a lower inflation rate than an equal decline brought
about by an open market purchase, the reserve ratio reduction leaves the real
interest rate higher than does the open market purchase.
Proposition 5. Let (73,1) represent an initial policy setting, and (Itm~lt~Itnom)
the associated initial rates of return. Let itnom = R(/3,1) for some
/3 < 73 , where itnom< Itnom . Suppose that there exists A < I such that
Rnom(ThA) = RnOm~and that Rm(ThA) > R~(fl,l). Finally, suppose that the
“conventional wisdom” (in the sense of Proposition 1) holds for each
(fi,A) [~3,73] x [A,I] , that ~~ffl(fi,1) > 0 for /3 E [/3,73] , and that
~om(73A) > 0 for A [~,X] . Then R(73,~) > R(fl,X)
Proof:
Suppose R(73,A) ~ R(/3,1) . Then since ~(fl,A)> 0 throughout the
relevant domain, there exists A [A,1) such that it(fl,A) = R(/3,1) . Now
OR
Proposition 2 ensures that ~(73,A) > 0~throughout the relevant domain.
Consequently we must have R~(73,A) it~(7J,A) > Rm(fi~l) , which is to say
R~(73,A) > R~(/3,X) . This inequality contradicts Proposition 1. Thus
R(73,A) > R(/3,1)31
VII. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to use a general equilibrium model of
deficit finance to compare the relative magnitudes of the increases in the
rate of inflation associated with attempts to reduce market interest rates
through open market purchases, or reductions in the required reserve ratio.
We have identified conditions under which changes in both policy instruments
have the “conventional” effects just described -- conditions under which both
open market purchases and reserve ratio reductions tend to drive down the real
interest rate while driving up the inflation rate. We have shown that under
these circumstances a given reduction in the real interest rate engineered
through open market purchases always yields a smaller increase in the rate of
inflation than an equal reduction brought about by a decrease in the required
reserve ratio. Thus in our model an inflation-averse policymaker who desires
to reduce the real interest rate should prefer an open market purchase over a
reserve ratio reduction.
We have also succeeded, though somewhat less completely, in identifying
conditions under which the nominal-rate analogue of the aforementioned
“conventional wisdom” holds true. We have also shown that there are
circumstances, consistent with the real-rate version of the conventional
wisdom, under which the nominal-rate version holds for open market purchases
but not reserve ratio changes -- circumstances in which a reduction in the
nominal interest rate engineered through a change in the required reserve
ratio requires an increase in the ratio. Under these circumstances an
inflation-averse who desires to reduce the nominal rate will prefer to32
increase the reserve ratio rather than carry out the open market purchase
which generates the same rate.
While we have not been able to rule out the possibility that there are
model specifications/policy settings, consistent with the conventional wisdom,
under which the aforementioned nominal rate-reducer might prefer reserve ratio
reductions to open market purchases, we have been unable to find such
specifications/settings. Finally, we can show that if situations of this type
do arise the decline in the real interest rate caused by the reserve ratio
reduction will be smaller than the decline caused by the open market purchase
which produces the same nominal interst rate. Thus whenever reserve ratio
changes are the least inflationary tool for no~~iinal rate-pegging, they are
also the tool which which produces the least improvement in real credit
conditions.33
Footnotes
1. For a description of current Federal Reserve System monetary policy
operating procedures, and the sense in which they are similar to (and
different from) the interest rate-targeting procedures characteristic of
the years prior to 1979, see Wallich (1984), esp. pp. 21-22, 26-27, and
Gilbert (1985), esp. pp. 19-21. For an example of a recent policy
intervention apparently designed to reduce interest rates, see note 8
below.
2. For a detailed account of the history and impact of the 1936- 1937 reserve
ratio increases see Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 520-532.
3. This source of restraint is emphasized by Toma (1988), who argues that it
prevented the System from increasing reserve ratios in order to enhance
its seigniorage revenues. However, Haslag and Hem (1989) conclude that
the reserve requirement burden has not in fact increased during the years
since the passage of the Monetary Control Act. See also Sellon (1984),
esp. p. 12.
4. See Goodfriend and llargraves (1983), esp. pp. 15-16, Goodfriend (1984),
and Sellon (1984), esp. p. 11.
5. This point is made by Toma (1988); see note 3 above. See also Sellon
(1984), esp. pp 15-16; Sellon emphasizes the ptential usefulness of
manipulating the differential reserve ratios on various classes of managed
liabilities as a device to improve control of the broader monetary
aggregates.
6. Our focus on overlapping generations models is not intended to imply that
analysis of the sort we conduct cannot be, or has not been, conducted
using dynamic general equilibrium models of other types.
7. Strictly speaking, Wallace showed that in a stationary economy without
population or per capita output growth (with a gross total output growth
rate of unity) the conventional wisdom must fail whenever the gross real
interest rate on bonds exceeds unity (see p. 15 below). The assertion
contained in the text is a straightforward extension of this result to the
case of a constant output growth rate.
8. The real growth rates cited are average quarterly percent changes in real
GNP, seasonally adjusted annual rates (source: U.S. Commerce Department).
The real interest rate cited is the difference between the average annual
interest rate on 90-day Treasury bills (source: Federal Reserve System)
and the average annual percent change in the all-items Consu~nerPrice
Index (source: U.S. Department of Labor).34
9. The figures cited are ratios of the annual average U.S. national debt
(source: U.S. Treasury Department) to the annual average U.S. monetary
base (source: Federal Reserve System).
10. Walsh (1983) considers, but ultimately rejects, the notion that the
Federal Reserve System should attempt to target the real interest rate.
His rejection is based in part on the difficulty of usefully defining
and/or accurately measuring this rate.35
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An economy in which the conventional wisdom holds [ ~(/3,A) > 0 ] for
plausible initial values of A, it, and R~,and relatively large values of /3:
Let U(c1,c2) = in c1
+ in c2 , as in Examples 1-3. Each generation t1
consists of N savers endowed (w~,w~) = (1,0) and N borrowers endowed
(w~,w~) = (40,39); consequently S = and D = N(20-~) . Finally, let
G = 0.015 and A = 0.1 . Since R(0,~) ~ 0.9535 > R~(0,j~) = 0.7 , this
value of A is binding for all /3 > 0 . Since we require D(it) < 0, which is
to say it < = 0.975, the range of relevant fl-values must be confined to
those consistent with R(fl,~) < ; the fl-range this condition generates has
-~ ..- OR
the form /3 (0,13), with /3 ~ 9.49 . Analysis of ~ reveals that
/3 ~ 10.14 > 13, so the conventional wisdom holds for all relevant values of /3
OR
When /3 = 9, for example, R ~ 0.974 , R~~ 0.923 , and ~ 0.00527
OR
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